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China's banking industry has struggled since the 1990s, partly as a
result of numerous Non-Performing Loans ("NPLs").' While the People's
Republic of China managed to avoid the severe financial crises suffered by
many of its East Asian neighbors, the large volume of these distressed
NPLs, as well as poorly performing state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") and
underdeveloped and underutilized capital markets, demonstrates that the
People's Republic of China is essentially hindered by many of the same
2short-comings affecting its neighbors in crisis. In an effort to shore up a
fragile banking system, there have been several attempts to jump-start asset
securitization in the region. Unfortunately, these attempts have met with
little success. Despite a great deal of effort on all sides, securitization has
lagged in China for several reasons including the immaturity of China's
capital markets, the inadequacy of China's legal infrastructure for
securities, a shortage of regional investors, fundamental philosophical
contrasts between aspects of the Chinese Law3 and the characteristics
JD Candidate, 2006, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 Patrick J. Schena, Banks, Distressed Loans, and the Development of Chinese Markets
for Asset-Backed Securities, 29 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF. 35 (2005); see generally Hui
Cao, Asset Securitization: Is it a Resolution Option for China's Non-Performing Loans?, 28
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 565, 570-72 (2003).
2 Schena, supra note 1, at 35; see generally Cao, supra note 1, at 570-72.
3 With the Communist takeover in 1949,
the People's Republic of China quickly abolished the [Republic of China's] legal codes and
attempted to create a system of socialist law copied from the Soviet Union .... In drafting
the new laws, the PRC has declined to copy any other legal system wholesale, and the
general pattern has been to issue laws for a specific topic or location. Often laws are drafted
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requisite of healthy securities markets.4
Recent changes in China's securities regulation legislation in 20015
have led to growing speculation that China is moving towards becoming a
viable market for securitization.6 In February 2004, a statement by the State
Council of the People's Republic of China reasserted its objective to reform
and develop China's capital markets.7 This commitment could keep China
on the path towards developing a new legal framework for China's
securities markets, "including formal implementation of the parallel
development of specific securities and banking regulations. 8  Currently,
China simply has not come far enough in developing a legal infrastructure
to handle such a highly specialized and regulated field as asset-backed
securitization.
9
This article proposes that asset-backed securitization in China could be
jump-started by first focusing on cross-border (sometimes called
transnational) securitization, and by establishing a dependable group of
regional investors. Cross-border securitization transactions would enable
China to experiment with various packaging of state-owned securities on a
trial basis through a transaction-by-transaction process. Thus far, the focus
has been specifically on reforming the legal infrastructure so that China
eventually would be able to attract investors and capitalize on an emerging
market.10 Rather than attempting to both build an infrastructure and attract
asset-backed securitization investors with large, sweeping changes, the
market would be better served by building up the securitization
infrastructure gradually and by developing a core group of regional
investors at the same time.
Part I of this article discusses the history of the People's Republic of
China in developing a securities market. Starting with the Communist
Party's rise in 1949, China has moved from a strict nationalization of the
on a trial basis, with the law being redrafted after several years. This process of creating an
[sic] legal infrastructure piecemeal has led to many situations where the laws are missing,
confusing, or contradictory ....
Law of the People's Republic of China, WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Chinese_law#People.27sRepublic.of China (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
4 See generally Kevin T.S. Kong, Prospects for Asset Securitization Within China's
Legal Framework. The Two-Tiered Model, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 237, 237-40 (1998).
5 See Schena, supra note 1, at 35.
6 Sharon M. Lee, The Development of China's Securities Regulatory Framework and the
Insider Trading Provisions of the New Securities Law, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1, 2 (2001)
("The new Securities Law aims to preserve the unprecedented economic growth and
cultivate investor confidence and maintain the integrity of the financial markets.")
7 Schena, supra note 1, at 35.
8id.
9 See Lee, supra note 6, at 2-3.
1o See generally Kong, supra note 4, at 249-55.
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market towards the current state-dubbed "socialism with Chinese
characteristics."'" Deng Xiaoping'S 12 strategy in the late 1970s aimed to
incorporate the use of "market mechanisms and foreign capital and
technology to expedite and promote the growth and modernization of the
economy."'
13
Part II discusses Chinese reform and its goals. This includes the push
towards corporatization, securitization, and limited privatization,' 4 as well
as the goal of these strategies: to bring about private sector investment of its
capital into the Chinese securities market. Part II also discusses the
specific limitations China faces in moving towards a system of limited
privatization, as well as the benefits the People's Republic hopes to reap.
Part III discusses the current state of the Chinese securities
infrastructure. This includes a discussion of the inherent conflicts that
result when the requirements for an effective securities infrastructure are
pitted against limitations that China's political philosophies place on
currently developing securities laws. 16
Part IV introduces the general principles of cross-border securitization.
This includes the importance of contract law in cross-border securitized
transactions, as well as the process of establishing a set of industry best
practices. Part V explores the possibility of applying this process to
China's burgeoning securities markets. Part VI concludes by discussing the
potential for future growth.
I. HISTORY
After assuming power in 1949, the Communist Party implemented a
"centrally controlled" economic system in the People's Republic of China. 17
This included an abolition of China's free markets and a nationalization of
the nation's private companies.18 True to the Marxist model, the Chinese
Communist Party intended to maximize productivity by rallying all workers
to the common cause of the good of the country. In practice, however, the
Marxist model provided little incentive for workers to meet high levels of
" William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict Between
China's Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 477,
478 (2002).
12 A revolutionary elder in the Communist Party of China, Xiaoping served as China's de
facto ruler from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, a period in which China became one of the
fastest growing economies in the world. Deng Xiaoping, WIKIPEDIA, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DengXiaoping (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
13 Lee, supra note 6, at 5.
14 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 477-78.
15 Id. at 478.
16 Id. at 479-81.
17 ZHU SANZHU, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CHINA 3-4 (2000).
18 d.
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efficiency. 19  Furthermore, across the board, there was little to no
accountability regarding successes and failures, profits and losses.2 ° Instead
of the efficient and productive machine the Communist Party envisioned,
China's economy wallowed in an atmosphere of massive waste and loss.
21
As the state sector continued to struggle, the private sector began to
generate profits. As a result, a large slice of the nation's capital fell into the
hands of the populace.22 As the trend continued throughout the 1970s, the
Communist Party began to feel the effects of the ailing economy, and the
state-owned enterprises fell further into financial troubles.23 If capital was
not generated soon, it was likely that a large portion of the state sector
would teeter off the brink into dissolution and bankruptcy.24
This came to a head in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping, the leading Chinese
senior official, pushed China's foreign policy in a new direction. Deemed
"socialism with Chinese characteristics," Xiaoping adopted an open-door
policy "centering on economic reforms utilizing market mechanisms and
foreign resources to speed up the growth and modernization of the
economy. 
'125
The 1990s were highlighted by a banking system that had fallen prey
to non-performing loans. Bank loans are currently the most dominant
source of funds for the Chinese financial system. 6 As recently as 2002,
approximately 20 percent of these loans were considered non-performing
by international standards-the equivalent of around 20 percent of China's
GDP.27 This is the albatross around the neck of China's securities market.
The establishment of a viable asset-backed securitization market is severely
hampered by such a lack of funds, particularly in light of the fact that the
available pool of diversified assets is limited and relatively unstable.28 The
essential problem facing China is that although there is a desire to reform-
19 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 477.
20 id.
21 Id.
22 This resulting disparity was troublesome to the Communist Party. Id. at 478 ("The
government viewed the disparity in wealth between the state-owned sector and the private




26 As of 2005, bank loans "constitut[ed] more than 80 percent of the annual increase in
average fund flows for the last three years." Schena, supra note 1, at 36.
27 Id. at 36-37.
28 Id. at 37. Such a high concentration of financial assets in a single class, burdened
further by suspect quality, severely hampers building the diversified pools of assets required
for effective securitization. Moreover, where the benefits of securitization in the form of
asset management, liquidity, and capital management flexibility would otherwise accrue to




with compelling reasons to do so-no clear-cut direction has been
established by the government that would effectively lead to a stable market
for securitization.
In an attempt to keep an ailing state sector afloat, China has started
down the road towards the use of securitization as a means to tap into
private equity. 29 As a result, economic reform has yielded for China an
economy with one of the most rapid growth rates in the world.3° Much of
this has to do with the lessening of the government's hold over its
industries, and it is clear that the Communist Party will have to open up
even further to the idea of privatization and less government interference if
China is to continue its economic growth, especially in the state owned
sector. These ideas are discussed further in Part II.
II. CHINA'S GOALS IN REFORM
The Communist Party's strategy for economic reform centers around
three core principles, all of which are still being developed to this today.31
The first is "corporatization." 32 This is the idea that state-owned enterprises
can be converted into shareholding companies. 33 However, there is an
inherent difficulty in applying the principles of corporatization to a
communist regime. In order for the Chinese government to maintain
absolute control over state enterprises, it is a theoretical impossibility to
open up these enterprises to shareholders (specifically potential
international investors).
The second principle, put in motion by Xiaoping's reform and still
being developed today, is "securitization., 34 In this context, securitization
is "the sale of shares of state-owned enterprises in the securities market.
3 5
This practice has come to be seen as a possible saving grace for China's
state-sector. 36 It would allow the state-run enterprises to generate capital by
appealing to private sector investors, but would require a loosening of
government control over the enterprises.
The third and final principle China plans to fully implement is the idea
of "limited privatization." This is the missing link that will allow the
corporatization and securitization of the state sector to effectively function
in a communist environment. Limited privatization involves the "minority
private equity participation in state-owned enterprises so as to enable the
29 See generally Friedman, supra note 11, at 478-81.
30 Id. at 479.
31 See generally id. at 478-80.
32 Id. at 478.
33 Id.
14 See id.
35 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 478.
36 See Kong, supra note 10, at 237-40.
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government to retain majority control of the market. 3 7  In order to
adequately regulate such an industry and attract investors, it is necessary to
create a certain level of transparency that the Communist Party may not be
ready to permit.
While the general principles of privatization may not appear to go
hand in hand with China's political ideologies, China has historically shown
itself to be adept at utilizing western concepts in the context of Chinese
need.38 In this instance, the government retains the controlling interest in
"privatized" entities. The resulting transaction resembles less of a private
sale of state assets and more of a mechanism for funneling private funds
into state-controlled enterprises. 39 The goal is to infuse the excess private
capital of Chinese citizens into a more productive system of state-run
enterprises. 40 The state continues to hold a controlling share in state-owned
enterprises, faithfully adhering to the Marxist principle that "ownership of
the means of production" shall remain in the hands of the state as a
surrogate for the people.4'
III. CURRENT STATE OF CHINESE LAW AND OBSTACLES TO
OVERCOME
China's securities regulatory framework has been described as a
"patchwork system," evolving primarily through landmark laws and follow-
up "clarification and application" through national government regulation.42
This has been a slow evolution from the original state of the securities
37 Matthew D. Bersani states:
The term 'privatization' means something very different in the Chinese context than in
Eastern Europe, South America, or other places where privatization has occurred.
Privatization in China does not involve a radical departure from past practices, inspired by
political necessity. Rather, it is the continuation of a process begun 15 years ago, and is
motivated largely by excessive capital accumulation by private individuals in [China], rather
than by the state's dire economic needs.
Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Companies in China, 1993
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 301, 303 (1993). For more explanation, see Friedman, supra note 11,
at 478.
38 Bersani, supra note 37, at 302. "The phrase 'make foreign things serve China' dates
back to the late Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1616-1911) and has since proved to be an
indispensable part of the Chinese cultural heritage." WEI JIA, CHINESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
LAWS AND POLICIES: EVOLUTION AND TRANSFORMATION 2 (1994). For a study of this
principle, see generally id. at 2-4.
39 Bersani, supra note 37, at 303.
40 Minkang Gu & Robert C. Art, Securitization of State Ownership: Chinese Securities
Law, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 125 (1996).
41 See Bersani, supra note 37, at 305.
42 See Kong, supra note 4, at 249.
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infrastructure which focused primarily on local regulation.4 3 It was not
until December of 1998 that the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress adopted a legal framework that began to resemble that of
the United States Securities Act of 1933 and the Financial Services Act of
1986 in the United Kingdom." In addition to these regulations,
development in other areas of law helped to promote a promising securities
regulatory system in China.45 However, the framework in place is still
insufficient to support a truly viable securities market.4 6 This is especially
true regarding foreign regional investors.47 Furthermore, the current state of
Chinese capital markets and the lack of institutional investors have made
transparency and the availability of information all the more critical, yet
these are still greatly lacking.48  While Chinese-based securitized
transactions are a step in the right direction and certainly play a large role in
increasing corporatization and securitization of China's state-owned
enterprises, shutting out foreign investors is counter-productive to the
ultimate goal of maximizing capital.49 Given the right legal infrastructure,
43 Sanzhu states:
The development of a securities regulatory framework in China has passed through two
stages distinguished by the creation of the national securities commission in 1992. In the
early stage, the People's Bank of China ("PBOC") was designated as a watchdog to oversee
the securities market in conjunction with various bodies of the central and local governments.
In that stage, securities regulations issued by certain local authorities were the main form of
regulation.
SANZHU, supra note 17, at 8.
44Id. at 13.
45 id.
46 See generally Friedman, supra note 4, at 478-81.
47 Kong, supra note 4, at 251-52 ("China currently lacks a comprehensive national legal
system for the successful transplantation of the U.S. model of asset securitization. Instead, a
patchwork of related Chinese laws and regulations on the creation of a security interest
provides only an ad hoc framework for supporting domestic Chinese based asset
securitization transactions.")
48 Schena states:
[D]ue to the current state of capital market development, there are few institutional investors
in China, thus making information structures that much more important. Yet these credit
rating, accounting, and audit services remain weak and therefore undermine the credibility of
information disclosure. With specific reference to credit ratings, local agencies lack
reputational value, while overseas agencies frequently constrain local corporate ratings in
order to remain below central government levels. Pricing mechanisms are underdeveloped,
and as a result, risk is not effectively incorporated into bond spreads.
Schena, supra note 1, at 43.
49 For an overview of China's encouragement of foreign investment and trade
opportunities in various areas, see generally PRICE, WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS AND
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China's focus on limited privatization should adequately address concerns
the Communist Party has regarding foreign investment.5 ° Unfortunately,
the infrastructure, as is, cannot support this.51
Securities regulation is a vital component of any successful securities
market.52  In order for China to attract and maintain the requisite investors,
the market must adequately protect the interests of the investors. It must
safeguard the economic order and public interest, and promote the
development of a socialist market economy. 3 In China's case, the issue of
regulation is an important one for foreign businesses and foreign investors
in all aspects of business, not just securitized transactions.54 Within the
context of securitization, this is an issue that could be resolved as the
infrastructure more fully develops, and as the needs of the investors and the
INVESTING IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 20-25 (2002 ed.).
50 Bersani states:
China's policy of "limited privatization" may be reconciled with the Marxist principle
demanding state ownership of the means of production on the theory that, as long as the state
retains a controlling interest in the enterprise, no assets have been sold; rather, private capital
has been brought under the state's control. "Limited privatization" thus provides the
[People's Republic of China] government with a vehicle by which it can harness privately
held capital and thereby, at least theoretically, politically neutralize the private sector's vast
economic resources. Where a privatized state enterprise receives foreign investment, the
state also may be viewed as simply absorbing foreign capital, not ceding ultimate control
over the means of production.
Bersani, supra note 37, at 306.
51 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 479-80.
52 See generally ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 1-8 (2d ed. 2002).
53 Schena states:
Legal infrastructure is a necessary precondition of the development of indigenous [Asset-
Backed Securities] markets. Such infrastructure supports: 1) the transfer or sale of assets; 2)
the establishment of independent special purpose entities, in the form of either a company or
trust, to acquire the transferred assets; and 3) the issuance of debt securities. In China's case,
each of these presents a practical hurdle to effective securitization.
Schena, supra note 1, at 44.
54 PITMAN B. POTTER, FOREIGN BUSINESS LAW IN CHINA: PAST PROGRESS AND FUTURE
CHALLENGES 81 (1995) ("A discussion of the content and performance of the legal regimes
governing selected aspects of China's foreign business relations and of the attitudes that
affect performance suggest that the goals guiding Chinese regulatory efforts are at odds with
the main concerns of foreign business.") For a detailed discussion on Chinese regulatory
issues, see generally SANzHU, supra note 17, at 72-77. For a recent summation of the
regulatory environment in China from an investor's standpoint, see generally PRICE,
WATERHOUSE, supra note 49, at 43-51. For an interesting debate on the reform of Chinese
laws and regulation regarding foreign direct investment, see generally YAN WANG, CHINESE
LEGAL REFORM: THE CASE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW 70-122, 176-84 (2002).
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government are each taken into account.
The primary problem facing the Communist Party is how to balance
the need to maintain control over the state-sector while creating a viable
Western-s7le securities market that can attract investment from regional
investors. To some this appears to be impossible, ultimately dooming the
Communist Party to failure. 6 The sweeping changes and bold moves that
would likely come from a government desperate to maintain control57 are
not what the securities market needs.58 Such changes would do more harm
than good, creating a jumbled and unusable securities infrastructure. Of
course, if the fall of the Communist Party in the People's Republic of China
could be brought about by the securities market, it is hardly likely that the
government would go without a fight.59
When all is said and done, however, China's largest obstacle in
55 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 479-80.
56 Friedman states:
[W]ith the implementation of these Western capitalist market theories into the Chinese
marketplace, the survival of the [Communist] Party will be at stake. The inherent conflict of
one country having two systems - a communist government with a capitalist securities
market structure - makes it impossible for the [Communist] Party to retain control over
China without disposing of its securities market. Since the Securities Law of the People's
Republic of China ... is subservient to [Communist] Party ideology and objectives -
primarily state control over the securities market and its participating enterprises - the Law
does not work. Accordingly, either the securities market will fall or the current government
will fall. Because its failing state-run economy is in dire need of capital, the government has
no other alternative than to support the nation's securities market. Hence, it is inevitable that
China's current government will fall at the expense of its capitalist securities market.
Friedman, supra note 11, at 480.
57 This would most likely manifest itself in the Chinese government enacting Securities
Laws in an effort to force transactions through the system. The danger is that with little to no
transactional experience, it is highly probable that even if a transaction was successful the
first time through, the Laws would not be comprehensive enough to foster further
transactions. Even more dangerous is the likelihood that the Laws would not be successful at
all, but would nonetheless be integrated into China's already deficient Securities
Infrastructure. In such an instance, China would be taking two steps back in an effort to
prematurely jump one step forward.
58 This is why the idea of "limited privatization" is so important. It allows for the
government to retain control, while drawing capital into the state-owned enterprises and
simultaneously redistributing the growing private wealth that threatens the Party's security.
Specifically, the government hopes to shift its title in state-owned enterprises from
"manager" to "controlling stock holder." The hope is that private stock holders will increase
managerial accountability and encourage more efficient and profitable state-owned
enterprises. Taken a step further, employees can be given the option of owning shares of the
state-owned enterprises, which would hopefully provide the incentive to work harder and
perform more efficiently (something which has been missing in China's state sector). See
Bersani, supra note 37, at 305.
51 See id.
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creating and maintaining a viable Western-style securities market is not
solely the lack of securities infrastructure or the lack of investors, but rather
the existence of both shortcomings at the same time. Theoretically, a
market with a viable securities infrastructure could implement slight
changes in law, or practice, to attract investors. Likewise, a core group of
investors could effectively influence change in various "problem areas"
inherent in any securities infrastructure. 60 In fact, without the investors, it
will be difficult to build and fine tune an infrastructure to provide the
requisite transactions to uncover and explore the ins and outs of China's
securities laws and how they can best serve the needs of the Communist
Party and the state sector without compromising transparency and fairness
among the private investors. 61 Likewise, without an infrastructure that can,
at a minimum, guarantee transparency and fairness, it is highly unlikely
China will be able to build up such an investor base, especially with other
regional options readily available in the Eastern Asia market.62
Interestingly, investment banks such as JP Morgan have recently made
a push towards establishing traditional asset-backed securitization in
China.63 The efforts of these investment banks have recently resulted in
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raising both foreign currency ratings on
the People's Republic of China by one notch, to "BBB+/A-2", in February
of 2004.64 The onus now falls on China and the investment banks to try and
maintain momentum in an environment laden with the pitfalls of an
underdeveloped securities infrastructure. So the question becomes, what
will China do?
While some theorize that the market will eventually be liberalized and
the reins will be loosened by the Communist Party, it is difficult to set this
to any sort of timetable. Eventually, China will have to alter its securities
infrastructure to one that more closely resembles the Western framework if
it is to become a permanent fixture in the international securities market.
65
China's liquidity needs and ailing state-sector, however, require an
60 This idea is expanded on in Part V. It speaks directly to the natural evolution of
securitized transactions. Essentially, the legitimacy of securitized transactions, especially
from an investor's standpoint, relies a great deal on past successes. Therefore, a market's
continued success, often due to changes facilitated by attorneys to meet investor demands,
ultimately comes together to form a sort of market "Best Practices."
61 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 515-16.
62 See Cao, supra note 1, at 570.
63 jp Morgan has been at the forefront in stimulating the Chinese market. See generally
Friedman, supra note 11, at 514.
64 Rating on China Raised to 'BBB+' as Reform Yields Results and Revenues
Rise;:Outlook Positive, Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect, at
http://www.securitization.net/pdf/sp/ RatingChina_20Feb04.pdf (Feb. 17, 2004).
65 See Lan Cao, The Cat That Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant
Privatization Model, 21 BROOK. J INT'L L. 97, 100 (1995).
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immediate boost,66 and may not be able to sustain a prolonged battle
between the capitalist securities market structure and the desire for the
Communist Party to retain control.67  A solution that has yet to be
thoroughly explored is cross-border (transnational) securitization. If
properly implemented and nurtured, cross-border securitization may be one
way to jump-start China's securities market, attract investors, and allow for
a steady and efficient development of a Western-style securities
infrastructure that can fit into the Communist Party's idea of limited
privatization.
IV. TRANSNATIONAL (CROSS-BORDER) SECURITIZED
TRANSACTIONS
A. A Brief Overview of How International Systems for Securities are
Established
An essential element of international systems for securities-a
category under which cross-border securitization falls-is the idea that legal
rules can be manifested not only through common law and statute but also
through the willful acceptance of terms between contracting parties.68
Article 1134 of the Code Napoleon formulates this idea in stating, "les
conventions legalement formees tiennent lieu de loi a ceux qui les ont
faites" or "contracts that have lawfully been entered into stand for the law
as between the parties that have made them., 69  This is an extremely
important concept in dealing with international securities markets. While
there may not be specific statutes guiding the international securities
markets, there is an understanding and acceptance that the contracts that
parties have entered into - in other words, previous transactions of a similar
nature - are to stand as a source of legal rules and body of law.7° In
essence, these legal rules are created through trial and error in an effort to
maximize fairness and satisfaction on the sides of all parties involved.
The general principle is that systems of contracts, drawn up by many
lawyers over time, eventually lead to a "petrification" of contractual
content.71  This means that repeated transactions, and the contracts
accompanying them, form a sort of "best practices" for the particular
market. This is underscored by the market and the market participants'
"drive for widely-accepted and predictable solutions to business disputes
66 See generally Kong, supra note 4, at 238-40.
67 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 480.
68 Eddy Wymeersch, The Law of Cross Border Securitization: A Comment on Frankel,
12 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 501 (2002).
69 Id.
7 Id. at 501-03.
71 id.
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between merchants trading different places in the world.""2 This principle
is directly applicable to international securities markets. The development
of a standardized legal practice is highly desirable in areas where intricate
legal schemes are involved.
Applying the Code Napoleon model to the securities market, it is
evident why contractual history makes for a more workable framework than
specified statutes when dealing with parties in different countries.
"Efficiency, economies of scale, and risk aversion ... are [generally]
among the major factors underlying development [in a given area of
international business]. 73  Participants in securitized transactions -
investors, sellers, underwriters, purchasers, etc. - likewise want a
dependable and predictable system in which to operate. These systems are
established through continued work and the success of previous contractual
transactions.74 Using this foundation, it is possible for such a system to be
further utilized through a cross-border securitization framework in
gradually building a viable Western-style securities market in China - one
that adequately takes into account the Communist Party's desire to maintain
limited privatization.
B. An Introduction to Cross-Border/Transnational Securitized Transactions
and General Practices
Cross-border securitized transactions traditionally develop because of
opportunities presented in existing international business practices. The
general structure for these transactions is:
(i) The company originating the asset is in one country; (ii) a trust or
other special purpose entity in another country purchases the
originator's receivables; (iii) the payors on the receivables are outside
the originator's country; (iv) the receivables are largely denominated in
the same currency as the securities; and (v) the trust receives payments
directly from the payors and makes distributions directly to investors.
75
This structure allows for certain transactional practices in Country A to
be combined with business practices in Country B in a complimentary
72 Id. at 503.
73 Id.
74 Here, success is likely defined as transactions that do not result in litigation.
Ultimately, any two parties could undertake a transaction without seeking legal guidance.
However, the high transaction costs and the desire to do continual business within a
transaction's framework (sometimes referred to as a program deal) reinforce the need for a
level of security and legitimacy that can only be guaranteed by experienced attorneys
providing a continual showing of successful transactions.
75 Yuliya A. Dvorak, Transplanting Asset Securitization: Is the Grass Green Enough on
the Other Side?, 38 Hous. L. REV. 541, 542 (2001).
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manner. In such an instance, a cross-border securitized transaction attempts
to utilize both countries' laws in order to maximize profitability for all
parties involved.76
The key aspect of cross-border securitization is that it does not rely
entirely on one country's laws.77 Instead, parties can draft transactional
contracts based on beneficial aspects of multiple countries' laws.78 These
contracts are then applied to a transactional framework that is often at least
loosely-based on the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
standards. These transactions are then fine-tuned through the process of
repeated work by the attorneys drafting the various contracts over the
course of various transactions.
Once this loose structure of rules is applied to the transaction, the fine-
tuning of the terms for the transaction is hashed-out through the
transactional documents. In this way, lawyers act as "vectors" for
developing a common body of concepts, techniques, and the like to be
applied to securitized transactions that will take place in the future. 79 Each
transaction adds to the body of cross-border transactional contractual law
while simultaneously permitting a degree of freedom in which attorneys can
expand the scope of the market itself.80 All of this is underscored by
investor confidence. Because this body of law is created through continual
contractual work, keeping in mind the best interest of all parties involved,
investors are encouraged to continually work with sellers and attorneys to
try variously structured transactions in an attempt to maximize capital.
A great deal of this investor confidence also stems from the fact that
most of these transactions are loosely modeled after SEC practices. 81
Generally, the school of thought is that if certain transactions can be
structured to work within an SEC framework, they could likewise be
76 Usually the cross-border securitizations are structured using a United States model, as
the United States presents the largest securitization market in the world. It is important to
note, however, that the United States is not the only country in the world with an established
securitization market and developed financial infrastructure. See Dvorak, supra note 75, at
542-43.
77 Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, But Not Lawless, 8 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 255, 256 (1998).
78 This is important, in that countries like China, who present many opportunities for
potential securitized transactions, are often the same countries that could benefit the most
from securitization were it not for a lack of fine-tuned securities infrastructures. See Dvorak,
supra note 75, at 543.
79 See Wymeersch, supra note 68, at 502-04.
80 The unique aspect of such an evolution is that attorneys are creating a body of
contractual law that can continually be fine-tuned to deal with any troubles previous
transactions have encountered. Likewise, because of the nature of the international securities
market, attorneys can also continue to branch off into new areas where securitized
transactions may not have yet been attempted.
81 See generally Wymeersch, supra note 68, at 502-04.
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structured to utilize similar aspects of another country's laws. 2 These
cross-border deals have the benefit of developing along the lines of
international business practices with which investors may be familiar or
comfortable. These deals are also applied to the United States' proven SEC
framework. 83 The ultimate rationale for this mentality-and high level of
investor confidence-is stated by Eddy Wymeersch in "The Law of Cross-
Border Securitization":
The movement [involving cross-border securitized transactions] is
driven by many factors such as acceptability in the international
securities markets, the aversion of underwriters, banks, and lawyers to
introduce new rules to which unknown risks are attached, the
international recognition of good practice and a certain form of
competition for excellence, resulting in best practice. The lawyers
working on these deals are the vectors for developing this common body
of concepts, techniques, phrases, presentations, and the like.
84
So long as transactions continue to prove fruitful, investors will remain
confident. This provides attorneys with the requisite body of transactions to
create an effective and dependable body of law to help govern the cross-
border securitization market.
C. Establishing Program Transactions
Program transactions are sequential securitized transactions in which
the general structure of a transaction is used over a period of time on a
scheduled basis. In order for these transactions to arise, it is first important
that a particular concept or area of law and a securitization technique have
been found to produce a successful end. This would entail a transaction
that has not been litigated, and moreover, one that would provide something
to the parties involved that would make them want to do it again. This is
characterized by the transaction being profitable and manageable by both
sides and is at times quantified using one of two efficiency models.85
Efficiency is generally defined using either the Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency model.8 The Pareto efficiency model states, "in the context of a
securitization transaction, [the transaction is efficient if it] would make the
parties to the securitization-the originator and the [Special Purpose
Vehicle]-better off, and no parties worse off. '87 Generally, the parties
82 Id.
83 Id. at 503.
84 Id. at 503-04.






who are potentially made worse off would be the unsecured creditors, 88 but
in China's case there might also be a question of the State being made
worse off.89 The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency model states, "in the context of a
securitization transaction, [the transaction is efficient if] the aggregate
benefit to the parties to the securitization exceeds any net harm to other
parties. ' 9° The Kaldor-Hicks model tends to be used with more frequency
because "the conditions for Pareto superiority are almost never satisfied in
the real world." 91 That is, it is highly unlikely that no party is at all worse
off after securitization. The general consensus in the law and economics
universe, then, is that a transaction is efficient if "the aggregate benefit to
the [Special Purpose Vehicle's] investors and the originator exceeds any net
harm to the originator's unsecured creditors. 92
The next requirement is that the transaction be sound from an
investor's point of view, which is usually characterized by its profitability.
However, many securitized transactions boast high profitability at the cost
of high risk. For example, asset-backed securitized transactions involving
pooled loans bear the risk that the notes will not ultimately be paid out if the
pool of loans is not sustained.93  Thus, the transaction must be a sound
investment in that the pooled securities are rated highly by a rating agency,
or are seen as dependable investments based on past performance of similar
securities.
Finally, the transaction must be duplicable.94 This means that the pool
88 id.
89 The State might be worse off if it loses more control than it would like. This possible
dilemma is addressed later in Part V.B.
90 See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 1553.
91 Id. at 1554.
92 Id. Again, the Chinese Communist Party would have to be added to the "likely
endangered" party list in determining efficiency in these transactions. As will be discussed
later, the Chinese Communist Party will be able to dictate the amount of control they are
willing to relinquish by limiting the size of the state-sector assets that will be pooled for each
transaction.
93 This, of course, is dependent on the specific structure of the transaction. Furthermore,
the securities are rated by a ratings agency such as Moody's, Fitch, or Standard & Poor's, in
an effort to maximize transparency and the level of risk associated with each investment.
Nevertheless, surprises can, and do, occur. It is a tribute to the stability of the securities
market on the whole that investor confidence is not thrown off by the risk factors associated
with the transactions.
94 This is useful in the China example, as a single successful cross-border securitized
transaction could spawn a dozen more in a relatively short span of time. Furthermore, the
transactional structure would not necessarily need to be duplicated by the same parties. As
explained by Frankel, "[Actors in cross-border securitization] compete by creating unique
innovative structures, contracts and country combinations, but then seem to undermine their
competitive advantages by cooperating to convert their creations into standard and uniform
rules." See Frankel, supra note 77, at 256. Thus, cross-border transactions can be easily
replicated and almost always are. While the transactional documents themselves may be
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from which the assets were drawn and securitized must continue to contain
assets which can, in turn, be pooled and securitized in the future. Using the
example above, there may be a class of loans pooled and securitized by
Bank A that yields a profitable and seemingly dependable transaction.
However, unless the bank has a larger supply of that particular class of loan,
the transactional structure may not be as profitable if repeated. That is, the
structure may not be as successful at yielding positive results when a
different class of loan is pooled and securitized.
In practice, this works well with the idea that a continually growing
body of contractual law is mutually beneficial for all. The success of one
transaction between two parties, even if it does not result in the
establishment of a program deal, can open the door for other transactions
between other parties with similar assets.95 Furthermore, program deals
would then inherently have the benefit of providing a stable transaction that
can be subtly adjusted in an effort to maximize profits. For example, a
successful pooling and securitizing of Loan Group A under a specific
transactional structure may eventually evolve into a securitizing of Loan
Group A and Loan Group B simply by merit of slight adjustments made
periodically to the program deal. Over time, the structure evolves into a
more efficient and profitable mechanism that can be applied now to two
groups rather than one. Currently, such transactions are widespread and
continue to flourish in various securities markets across the globe.
V. APPLYING CROSS-BORDER SECURITIZED TRANSACTIONS TO
CHINA: CREATING A MARKET AND AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
INVESTORS
A. The Benefits of Cross-Border Securitized Transactions Over Traditional
Asset-Backed Securitized Transactions
As discussed earlier, traditional asset-backed securitization has failed
to gain steam in the Chinese market.96  So long as there is neither a
satisfactory securities market infrastructure in China nor a core group of
investors to provide a base for the securities market, it will be difficult to
attract the needed foreign investors-and their capital-into such a high
risk and unproven market.9 7 Asset-backed securitized transactions simply
protected, the ideas underlying the transaction itself cannot be copyrighted. Thus,
competitors can duplicate transactions by making small changes while operating under the
same transactional ideology. See id. at 270.
95 See generally id. at 268-72.
96 See generally Schena, supra note 1, at 35-37.
97 See Kong, supra note 4, at 251-52. See generally Dvorak, supra note 75, at 574-75.
The general concerns explored by Dvorak are prevalent in the Chinese example and are
discussed again in Part V.B.
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do not fit the Chinese market at this time. Therefore, the leading
securitization lawyers and investment banks should be focusing their efforts
on cross-border securitized transactions.
As discussed earlier, the primary draw of cross-border transactions is
that they develop because of opportunities presented by a combination of
beneficial laws in one or more countries and existing international business
practices that have been proven to maximize profitability for investors.98
After a successful combination has been repeatedly utilized in multiple
contractualized transactions, there remains the possibility that a profitable
program deal can emerge, encouraging an influx of investment and
securitization of the profitable pooled securities. Such an influx is exactly
what China has been looking for to provide much needed capital to the state
sector. 99
Even if there is not an immediate jump in regional foreign investment,
it is possible that China could help itself in demonstrating the benefits of
investment. There exists an ample base of private wealth in China which
could be tapped by an initial group of investors. 100 The key factor that
could attract this group of investors is the abundance of excess wealth in the
hands of private individuals who are facing low and unattractive interest
rates in Chinese banks-rates often lower than the rate of inflation. 10 1
Individual investors could be attracted to the higher returns that would
come from securities investment. Moreover, from the perspective of the
Communist Party, this provides an opportunity to steer private savings into
"an arena susceptible to the control of the state.' '0 2 Indeed, even if foreign
and regional investors were to jump at the opportunity to kick-start China's
securities market through cross-border transactions, the Chinese
government would be wise to heavily court private Chinese investors as
well.
Since Chinese securities laws are still insufficient, with the exception
of the occasional Chinese-based asset-backed transaction, it is unlikely that
asset-backed transactions will be adequately attractive to the savvy foreign
investor. °3  There simply is not a profitable advantage to investing in
Chinese securities, given the extent of government control, the lack of
transparency, and the overall lack of protection for investors. 0 4 The bottom
line for investors, then, is that China does not have an independently
98 See Wymeersch, supra note 68, at 503-04.
99 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 477-79.




103 See Kong, supra note 4, at 251-52.
104 See generally SANZHu, supra note 17, at 127-3 1.
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profitable securities infrastructure worthy of investment. 1°5  To draw
investors in, law firms and investment banks could instead push stability as
the primary selling point for utilizing cross-border securitizations.
The initial establishment of this class of securities would be difficult.
These securities would have to draw stability from a combination of
successful private market investment and state-sector shares achieved
through corporatization. One possible way of accomplishing this would be
to have the cross-border securitized transactions made up of several classes
of securities, including, but not limited to, a small section of state-sector
shares, a group of securities pooled for low risk, low profit private entities,
and possibly a cross-section of pooled securities for an established cross-
border transaction. The transaction would then need to be structured such
that investment in groups of these securities is encouraged so as to provide
a stable, but not necessarily an immensely profitable investment. 0 6 While
initially this seems like a Herculean task, with little upside for investors, a
closer look reveals that the specific classes of securities that could be
created by such a cross-border, joint security offering could be very
attractive for larger foreign investors. The success of such a transaction is
best examined in the context of how China specifically benefits.
B. China's Benefits from Cross-Border Secured Transactions and the
Benefits Passed on to Investors
The examination of the benefits of a cross-border, low-risk securitized
Chinese transaction must start with state-sector shares, which is the
investment group China is trying to improve.0 7 The first point to note is
that this set of shares is drawn from the corporatization of small parts of
China's state sector. In other words, a percentage of the shares in various
state-owned enterprises or state-owned shares of other companies are
placed into an asset pool. China's government has retained control in the
securities market thus far, as a result of the segregated share structure.' °8
While this segregation has limited investment in the past, it could be
utilized by the Chinese government to customize a class of securities
consisting of a specific pooled group of the state-owned enterprises.1
0 9
105 Id.; see generally Schena, supra note 1, at 35-37.
106 There is also a distinct possibility that mortgage-backed securities could eventually be
utilized to create an attractive pool for cross-border transactions. See infra note 117. See
generally Joyce Palomar, Contributions Legal Scholars Can Make to Development
Economics: Examples from China, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1021-22 (2004).
107 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 478.
108 See generally id. at 495-96.
109 In practice, the Chinese government would have to work with the firms drafting the
documents for the transaction in order to determine the correct makeup of this pool. It would
be important to open up ownership possibilities to interested investors, but in a limited
capacity (at least to start).
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Currently, China subdivides its share structure into four groups: 1)
state shares; 2) legal person shares ("C Shares"); 3) individual shares ("A
Shares"); and 4) foreign investor shares ("B Shares"). 110 The parties
involved in the transaction could use a larger percentage of a small group of
state-owned enterprises, or could instead choose to use a very small
percentage of a larger group of state-owned enterprises. Either way, the
benefit is that this would be a gradual process of securitizing a small section
of the state sector, either through direct shares of state-owned entities or
through portions of shares owned by state entities. The catch here is that
currently, state shares and legal person shares are prohibited from being
converted, transferred, or traded in the securities market in almost all
instances."1  Again, the benefit of using a cross-border transaction is
evident: China would be able to use a cross-border transaction as a test case
without changing this law.
Ultimately, the goal would be to fine-tune the current segregated
groups, possibly by creating a fifth group that would consist of state shares
that are permitted to be traded, such as a preferred state share. Since state
shares and legal person shares make up approximately 60 to 70% of the
total shares issued in China, 12 it would follow that the Chinese government
will eventually wish to tap into these potential assets. Until that point,
however, cross-border transactions would allow China to test the water
before diving in head first. An influx of capital could be fumneled into the
state-owned enterprises without the sweeping legal changes that would
provide the transparency and control that most investors require. In fact, at
the start, the state shares that the Chinese government is concerned with
protecting would only be a small aspect of the transaction. Hopefully, this
initial protection would not drastically affect the performance of the pool
itself, either negatively or positively.
As discussed earlier, much of what is now common practice in
international securities markets is the result of fine-tuning contractual-based
11o See Friedman, supra note 11, at 496.
111 Id. Additionally,
[s]tate shares are shares held by state-owned units designated by the government and may be
sold or transferred only with the approval of the respective state asset administrative
departments. These shares are not publicly traded. Legal person shares are shares held by a
company, usually another state enterprise, or legal entity other than the state or a natural
person. As with state shares, the transfer of legal person shares requires approval by the
relevant authorities.
K. Matthew Wong, Securities Regulations in China and Their Corporate Finance
Implications on State Enterprise Reform, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1221, 1238 (1996) (emphasis
added). See also GUANGHUA YU & MINKANG Gu, LAWS AFFECTING BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS IN THE PRC 90-91,93-94 (2001).
112 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 496.
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law over the course of many transactions.' 1 3 This is an optimal path for
China to take in establishing how it will deal with securitizing its state
shares. Because the state shares only need to make up a small percentage of
the total pooled securities, China will be able to control the flow of shares
into the transactional pools at as slow a rate as it deems necessary. As the
body of transactional contract law increases, the potential pitfalls of
investment-as well as the sale of the state shares-will become evident.
The Chinese government can then specifically legislate these matters. 1
4
In essence, using this approach, China will be shown the direction it
needs to head in order to create a successful securities market. This is a
drastic contrast to simply taking Western models and trying to apply them
to a socialist ideology. The result would be, first, the formation of a body
of contractual law guiding the evolution of the cross-border transactions.
Second, based on how these transactions progress and how the state-shares
perform as packaged securities, despite limited transparency and other
short-comings discussed earlier, China would be better informed as it drafts
statutes to foster direct investment.
At first glance then, this seems to be a viable course of action for
China to take. Unfortunately, this is still only half of the equation.
Although there is a logical progression as far as China's securities
infrastructure is concerned, there is still the question of investors. What
will attract them, and how will the initial cross-border securitized
transactions provide these incentives? The answer lies in the combination
of the state shares with the private market securities.
As discussed earlier, the private sector in China has fared well."' 5 By
pooling private sector assets together with state shares, investors would be
afforded a constant, low-risk, reasonably-profitable investment opportunity.
Because securitized transactions bring with them the usual label of high-
risk/high-yield opportunities, it is not only conceivable, but likely, that large
investors would be interested in diversifying their securities investment
portfolio by also investing in low-risk/low-yield securities." 6  The tight
leash the Communist Party keeps on the state sector, normally seen as a
113 See Wymeersch, supra note 68, at 503-04.
114Repeated transactions will yield increasingly efficient and all-encompassing
contractual law. Taking this information into account, China would have a body of
information not yet available involving the ins-and-outs of its state-shares and how they
might perform once pooled and offered to international investors. The implication seems to
be that the impasses and pitfalls encountered during the transactions would be beneficial in
the long run because they would serve as examples to China of how not to set up their
infrastructure. It is much easier to redraft a contract to account for problems on a transaction-
by-transaction basis than to implement ineffective law and try to work around it.
115 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 478.
116 This should be seen, not as the difference between high-risk and blue chip stocks, but
rather between high-risk stock and savings bonds.
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hindrance to investment, actually could be utilized as a way of adding
consistency to a group of pooled securities.
117
The counter-argument to this is that there already exist low-risk/low-
yield investment opportunities that can be reached outside of the securities
market. The added incentive to investors in the case of China, however, is
that they would be opening up an entire market. True, initially these
transactions would not be extremely profitable. However, a skillful
combination of the state shares, private shares, and an established
international share would certainly provide a stable investment, even at a
profit level lower than the average securitized transaction. To be sure, the
benefit to the investor is minimal at the start, but the future upside would be
immense.
VI. CONCLUSION: FUTURE GROWTH IN THE CHINESE
SECURITIES MARKET
The true upside to implementing a cross-border securitized transaction
practice in China is the potential positive impact it could have, turning
China into a hot-bed for investment. Currently, China is stuck trying to
implement sweeping changes throughout its securities infrastructure in
order to facilitate participation by investors. Moreover, these changes are
based almost exclusively on Western-style frameworks, and stand little to
no chance of ever succeeding in the communist People's Republic of China.
By contrast, the proposed cross-border securitized transactions would allow
117 There also exists the possibility that mortgage-backed securities could eventually be
pooled into such a transaction as well. There is evidence that such pooled mortgage loans
could be highly profitable and enticing for investors and for China:
[S]ince China amended its Constitution and Land Administration Law to permit the transfer
of "land use rights" to private persons, the market for privately owned apartments has more
than flourished. Individuals finance their purchases with twenty- or thirty-year home
mortgage loans. At this time, the Bank of China finances all these residential mortgage loans
with state money. If, instead of holding all this debt for twenty or thirty years, the Bank of
China could sell packages of thousands of its residential mortgage loans into the world's
securities markets and, thus, make private capital available for residential mortgage lending,
this process could generate trillions in state resources for the funding of other projects. This
source of capital for residential mortgage loans, however, will not become available until
China's property rights institution and other institutions complement one another. Private
mortgages must be proven enforceable over a long enough period of time to permit rating
agencies and investment banks to rate China's residential mortgage-backed securities highly,
and the necessary financing techniques and legal structures must be made available for
modem securitization of mortgage-backed debt.
Palomar, supra note 106, at 1021-22. If mortgage-backed securities are not ready to be
implemented into a cross-border securities transaction, the existence of such a lucrative pool
of loans "waiting in the wings" seems an enticing incentive for investors to push for the
development of China's legal infrastructure sooner rather than later.
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China to slowly figure out how to take aspects of the Western model and
apply them effectively and efficiently into their ideological framework.
Once one successful transaction is completed, and then another,
investors will gain confidence. As soon as a specific transaction type is
perfected (i.e., the desired level of stability of investment has been proven
to be attainable and duplicable), program deals can start to arise. It is from
these program deals that China will be able to begin branching out to other
areas of securitization or to other areas of the state sector.
Program deals will afford investors and attorneys the leeway necessary
to experiment on a relatively small level, while yielding results that would
be true to the market. As these successes and failures are documented,
China's securities infrastructure can slowly be updated to account for what
aspects of the Western model can be applied. It would only take a little
nudging before regional investors would begin to gobble up any securitized
transactions that could be offered. The initial stages of opening up the
market to securitization will, in fact, provide a more profitable alternative to
investors than they might be able to find even in traditional "American-
style" securitization.
la8
Again, it is essential to note that the primary selling point is the fact
that Chinese law does not exclusively govern these transactions. Because
established international business practices will be the foundation on which
the cross-border transactions are structured, there should be an increased
likelihood that investors will continue to invest in the evolving transactions.
As always, there is a chance that investors will simply not be interested, but
it seems to be the best alternative-and one not yet explored.
The benefits to both China and investors are clear. China's state sector
is given an immediate boost and investors are given a profitable reason to
invest in China's state shares. Furthermore, state enterprises continue to be
an important sector in the Chinese economy. Finished goods manufactured
by state-owned enterprise are central to the economy, and the sector itself is
118 Traditionally, securitizations are most desirable in those jurisdictions that can provide
established financial infrastructures. While there are generally lower risks and lower
transaction costs, returns on securitization in "safe" jurisdictions are also lower. See Dvorak,
supra note 75, at 573. Similarly, there are generally lower returns on securitizations of tried
and tested products as opposed to using innovative techniques that may result in higher
profits-but not always without a substantial risk of failure. Id. (In an example of high risk-
high-yield securitization, a prominent New York law firm was able to securitize a kimono
collection, resulting in unusually large profits for investors involved in the transaction).
Furthermore, many of these "safe" jurisdictions that are more attractive to investors for the
reasons listed above (low transaction cost and risk) actually have a lower demand for
securitizations. "Countries with domestic banks in a strong financial position and well-
developed mortgage finance systems are less eager to begin large-scale 'American style'
securitization... [while] Asian countries have a greater need to generate new capital, giving
their governments an incentive to pass new securitization laws." Id. at 573-74.
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a major employer of a large percentage of the population.' 1 9 Not only will
the capital redistributed into the state-owned enterprises help to offset some
of the waste that is inherent in Chinese state enterprise, 2 0 but the state-
owned enterprises will become more efficient. 12 ' For investors, the growth
of China's securitization infrastructure is the crown jewel. As the
infrastructure grows, investors will be more confident in investing in the
higher-risk/higher-yield enterprises. The result will be competing law
firms, each looking to work with China to utilize new innovations that will
be made possible as the framework is developed and as contractual
successes in cross-border transactions begin to accumulate. 122 Ultimately,
China will emerge with a sophisticated securities market based on aspects
of the Western-style transactional framework, while maximizing the idea of
limited privatization that might not have otherwise been attainable.
This seems an optimal time to try something new in China. The region
is ripe for securitization and needs only to get over the initial hump before
successes begin to snowball into a flourishing securitization market. It is
also clear that securitization will provide an answer to some of China's
internal needs for economic reform. But cross-border securitized
transactions can provide this outcome only if the necessary effort is put
forth at the ground level.
119 Wong, supra note 111, at 1226.
120 Wong addresses the issue of waste in his exploration of economic reforms and state
enterprises:
Before the reforms, state enterprises simply obtained investment funds from the state and
produced whatever output quota that was required by the state. Any additional profits were
remitted to the state. Under this system, there was no incentive to seek growth or change to
meet market demand. Further, because it was impossible for a firm under a state plan to
precisely estimate the actual operating costs, state enterprise managers' concern about cost
overrun was miniscule. Whenever there was a budget shortfall, the manager could simply
plead for a larger budget. In effect, the enterprises were operating under a 'soft budget
constraint' wherein being economic was irrelevant.
Id. at 1227. While reforms have begun to deal with this issue, it will ultimately be limited to
privatization that will yield the necessary managerial accountability to eliminate the majority
of the "waste." See Bersani, supra note 37, at 305.
121 See supra note 58.
122 See generally Frankel, supra note 77, at 268-72. Some of the more innovative cross-
border transactions and their mechanisms would likely be widely shared throughout the
securitization industry to encourage more transactions at a rapid pace, in order to determine a
broad adoption. "A broad adoption of an innovation verifies and enhances its value, thus
proving the success of the innovation." Id. at 271.
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